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ABSTRACT. The reaction time of financial markets presently constitutes one of the major challenges facing the state. Using the results of a qualitative research study, this article formulates and discusses an hypothesis concerning the short-termism of financial markets by presenting an analysis of the temporal horizons and cognitive maps of actors who "make or break" prices on emerging markets. Behind the power of the market hides a multitude of actors, analysts, strategists, economists, and portfolio managers who constitute a veritable epistemic community with its own dynamic of opportunity and constraint. The aim in this article is to unravel the various strands in the tapestry that weaves the interactions of those who "make the market." It is not embroidered by the invisible hand of God, or the devil, but, more simply, by the unceasing anticipations and interactions of a myriad of analysts and investors who draw their breath from Wall Street.
But, because crises can be self-fulfilling, sound economic policy is not sufficient to gain market confidence; one must cater to the perceptions, the prejudices, and the whims of the market. Or, rather, one must cater to what one hopes will be the perception of the market. In short, international economic policy ends up having little to do with economics.
-P. KRUGMAN (1998) Within only a few years, emerging markets have become the new El Dorado of international finance. Their emergence is certainly not new; in fact, most Latin American stock exchanges date from the end of the last century. 1 However, Wall Street's rediscovery of the gold mines that are these emerging markets has been at the origin of one of the most incredible gold rushes at the end of this century.
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International Political Science Review (1999), Vol. 20, No. 3, 307-330 Following the Latin American and Asian crises of 1995 and 1997, the international community has learned that these financial paradises can rapidly transform into durable nightmares as once prosperous gold mines turn into bottomless monetary abysses. Such episodes join the long series of somersaults, panics, and bubbles that mark the history of finance and also illustrate one of the most marked traits of the end of this century: the constant tug of war between states and financial markets (Kindleberger, 1996) . On the one hand, states are faced with the everincreasing inflows and outflows of capital that set the pace for economic growth. Financial markets, on the other hand, unceasingly undertake multiple choices, twenty-four hours a day, moving from one country to another in the search for margins and profits. At the height of the Asian crisis, the 1997 diatribes that opposed Malaysian leader Mahathir Mohamed and financial wizard Georges Soros symbolize this conflict.
3 Soros has become a symbol of "market tyranny" in the last few years, having launched several violent attacks on national economies which then fell like dominos. 4 This apparent opposition between states and financial markets can be qualified on many levels. It is important to remember that governments have historically been behind the creation of financial markets. The first was created by the British Crown in an effort to raise funds to finance the military exploits of the king (Carruthers, 1997) . 5 In addition, financial crises are not solely the consequence of short-termist financial markets. Devaluation of the Mexican peso in December 1994, for example, was mainly the result of a complex game of interactions between financial markets and government (Edwards and Naim, 1998; Cameron and Aggarwal, 1996; Roett, 1996) . This particular example demonstrates, in its sequence and timing, the extent to which economic and political temporalities interact: how much states are obliged to react quickly to financial markets and how much they seek to gain time and to build long-term credibility (Santiso, 1997 (Santiso, , 1999 .
The financial crises of the last few years have highlighted the vital importance of the temporal adjustments that face states. These crises have led to a questioning of the temporality of financial markets and, in particular, of the cognitive maps of financial operators, major actors in the origin of temporal adjustments imposed on states. To understand and discuss the short-termism of financial markets and to test its acuity is to question the very socio-economic dynamic of international finance, or, in other words, to enter into the black box to analyze the analysts.
States are traditionally defined by territorial sovereignty. It is, however, in challenging the monopoly of the Church over time, that the State consolidated itself. 6 Although markets have certainly not become the clock-masters, they have considerably broken the state's sovereignty over time. During the nineteenth century, the imperatives of industrialization-including coordination of the transportation of merchandise by rail and the organization of important public works projects to be carried out by masses of workers-imposed a standardization of temporal norms. While it is true that markets have appropriated the temporal norms forged by the state, they have recently imposed their own temporalities composed of accelerations, speed, and crises through the financial sphere over the last few decades. Each financial crisis launches a race between the international financial system, called in urgency to address deep disequilibriums in order to stop market reactions rapidly, and the inter-state system. Large sums thus mobilized with increasing rapidity (more than $50 billion came to the aid of Mexico, more than $17 billion to Thailand, $58 billion to South Korea, $43 billion for Indonesia, $22 billion to Russia and $41 billion to Brazil) contribute to the rhythm of this race. 308 International Political Science Review 20(3) Financial markets are no more the tyrants than they are the magicians, or the omnipotent short-termists that critics claim arbitrarily impose their law or will on states, which they were made out to be after the 1994 Mexican crisis and the Asian and Russian crises of 1997 and 1998. The temporal horizons of financial markets vary according to profession, product, and the constraints and resources that restrain or enlarge the temporal horizons of different actors. Going beyond diabolization of financial markets in the person of Soros, recent financial crises have shown how timely a study of the sociological aspects of markets is, and how important it is to analyze the analysts in order to understand financial dynamics. Behind the power of the market hides a myriad of actors, analysts, strategists, economists, and portfolio managers whose management styles and temporal horizons vary from one institution to the next and even within the same investment bank or the same pension fund. In short, these specialists constitute a veritable epistemic community with its own dynamics of opportunity and constraint.
In order to imagine the importance of the influence that international finance has on national economic policy, it is first necessary to learn how financial markets think. In this article I emphasize the importance of analyzing information games and the resulting anticipations which link operators and question the cognitive regimes and temporal reference points which link traders, investors, and other analysts whose anticipations contribute to "make or break" market prices. Based on a qualitative inquiry carried out with 50 New York and Parisian investment bank analysts after the Mexican crisis of 1995, this research is a first attempt to approach emerging markets from a socio-economic perspective and will be subsequently completed later in a more quantified manner.
To proceed into the black box, or to analyze the analysts, also means to rid ourselves of the persistent idea that financial markets, whether efficient or inefficient, are neutral homogenous entities that adjust automatically to information or economic variations. Their temporalities are made of sudden accelerations and ephemeral torpors, which murmur along, often in a contradictory manner, emitting much background noise and interference which alter prices, and much information which clouds, comforts, or undermines the fundamentals. Emerging markets, less transparent and rigorous as far as statistical information is concerned, are particularly sensitive to these antics.
Financial markets do not establish the reign of the invisible hand, but rather the reign of implicit handshakes and, from time to time, explicit strangulations, as with the corrections made to the detriment of Mexico, Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, and Russia between 1995 and . My aim in this article is to unravel the various strands in the tapestry woven of the interactions of those who make the market. It is not embroidered by the invisible hand of God, or the devil, but more simply by the unceasing expectations and interactions of a myriad of analysts and investors who draw their breath from Wall Street.
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The Socio-economic Analysis of Financial Markets
The financial crises that have occurred in the last few years in Latin America and Asia have given rise to multiple interpretations and analyses. One of the most remarkable traits of this literature is the gradual displacement of its center of gravity. From work centered on the economic fundamentals of the crises evolved a second generation of models that insisted on the sensitivity of economic fundamentals to changes in the anticipations of financial actors. 8 In other words, the literature has become increasingly interested in the "sentiments of the market" (Eichengreen and Mody, 1998) , in the mimetic rationality of actors (Shiller, 1987 (Shiller, , 1990 Orléan, 1989b) , in asymmetries of information (Mishkin, 1997) , and in the influence of self-realizing prophetic mechanisms and the diffusion of noise which affects financial markets (De Long et al, 1990; Shleifer and Summers, 1990; Shiller, 1995) . In short, the literature focuses on the behavior of financial actors, their anticipations and reactions to information and signals that are not only emitted by the economic fundamentals but also by other actors.
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We have thus witnessed the blossoming of a body of research which aims to explain the reactions of financial operators to risk analyses diffused by rating agencies (Reisen and van Maltzan, 1998; Larrain, Reisen, and van Maltzan, 1997; Cantor and Packer, 1996) and brokerage firms (Womack, 1996) . These works have proven the existence of market failures, and institutional biases, while at the same time underlining a rating agency's rigidity in downgrading a country. Rating agencies are even more indisposed to downgrading countries or corporations that are already clients. To lower a credit rating means to risk losing clients, especially if competitors adopt a more conciliatory outlook.
These works also underline the extent to which brokerage firms can be torn by conflicts of interest, subjugated to a double obligation to offer the best services to their clients as well as to sell the stocks these firms underwrite. Womack's research, for example, shows that the stocks recommended by underwriters perform poorly when compared with the "buy" recommendations of unaffiliated brokers, thus proving the importance of these conflicts of interest and the biases they occasionally introduce into the recommendations made by brokerage firms (Womack and Michaely, 1997) . 10 Cognitive biases can be maintained over relatively long periods (Sobel, 1985) even when one is not confronted with manipulated information, in the economic, not legal, sense of the word. The credibility that the market attributes to a particular analyst or institution may be as decisive as the information itself (Benabou and Laroque, 1992) .
These works thus insist on market distortions by analyzing, for example, the strategies followed by stockbrokers. One such strategy is "herding," or the tendency of money managers to buy and sell the same stocks, often in a synchronic manner, in order to maintain the same performance level as competitors (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Sharfstein and Stein, 1990) . Other works, such as those of North, Coase and Thaler, analyze the institutional effects and transaction costs inherent in financial markets. Not all analysts are interchangeable, they argue, and not all make the market. Certain analysts impose their own personal rhythms or accelerate or slow mimetic movements more than others. "The fact of belonging to a certain firm, which towers above the others in prestige or the volume of funds managed, gives more weight within the financial community to information given by certain of that firm's analysts," underlines a strategist of a big New York firm.
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Beyond the distortions that researchers have uncovered, the herd approach insists on the diversity of behavior and the multiplicity of financial actors. Not only are there multiple specializations within the financial profession, but behaviors can also vary within the same specialization. Judith Chevalier and Glenn Ellison, for example, have done a detailed analysis of mutual fund managers, notably highlighting reputational effects and the divergences in behavior between senior managers and junior managers, who are the first to have the incentive to herd (see also Lamont, 1995; Prendergast and Stole, 1996) . These works demonstrate the extent to which the investment decisions of fund managers depend on the temporal 310 International Political Science Review 20(3) horizons and career projections of portfolio managers Ellison, 1996, 1998 Whether it be the quarterly reports of companies or the public accounts of governments, each piece of information is awaited by a myriad of operators who are constantly nourished by information that must be dealt with as quickly as possible and occasionally in a matter of seconds when panic begins to set in. The central desk of the Reuters agency alone furnishes as many as 25 dispatches per minute and 27 000 pages of data per second. In less than half an hour, the equivalent of a daily newspaper is dispatched to more than 362 000 computer terminals located across the globe. 13 In the field of emerging markets, the Latin American market in particular, each operator follows the macro-economic indicators of each country, awaiting the arrival of statistics at regular intervals. Every bank thus has a daily calendar of events at its disposal. In the case of Goldman and Sachs, for example, for the first 15 days of February 1997, no less than 30 events (28 economic and 2 political) concerning Latin American emerging markets were recorded (including 5 for Mexico).
14 Information and rumors, interconnected in continuous flows, are passed on quickly, thus generating mimetic behavior; to imitate others becomes imperative for staying in the game. Dynamics of self-validating mimetic contagion, often disconnected from fundamental facts, thus develop, making the collective opinion of participants as determinant as the anticipation of future revenues in charting the course of stocks.
For André Orléan, an economist who has pushed this type of analysis furthest, understanding contagion movements requires analysis of the strategic interactions which appear and disappear between different actors operating in financial markets. He uncovers the sociological dynamic of financial markets by integrating interpersonal influences into his analysis, by understanding the game of cross-anticipations between different actors at time t and also their future beliefs about the market at time t+1. Financial bubbles are not simple mathematical artifacts but SANTISO: Analysts of Financial and Emerging Markets Analyzed 311 rather rational mimetic bubbles. In order to make them intelligible it is also important to understand the impact of market interactions. In such a way, a fall in prices during a financial crisis, such as that of October 1987, is self-reinforcing, containing an endogenous dynamic founded on the interaction between participants (Shiller, 1987) . Actors also develop mimetic strategies because there is risk in distancing oneself from average opinion (Orléan, 1989a,b) . Actors give in to conjecture on the behavior of other operators, integrating not only new information into their anticipation but also beliefs about the reactions that such anticipations will arouse in the behavior of other agents (Orléan, 1990) . Financial markets do not consecrate the exclusive reigns of single-minded calculators closed in on themselves. On the contrary, they constitute an open world in which the speed imperative is primary and where anticipations are made and unmade at high speeds, operating via a wise dose of calculation and opinion. One must know how to profit from windows of opportunity, which open and close at high speeds, more rapidly and durably than competitors, especially when one is faced with the instability of emerging markets.
The Short-termism of Financial Markets
Speed is even more pronounced today than it was during the 1980s and early 1990s. International finance has experienced a series of major changes: new actors have appeared, innovations have multiplied, new markets have emerged, and, beyond institutional or operational changes, we have witnessed a significant acceleration of time.
The liberalization and deregulation of bond markets in 1979, and of the stock market in 1986, accompanied rapid acceleration in the financial sphere. 15 Thus, between 1980 and 1992, the annual growth rate of financial stocks in OECD countries attained a yearly average of 6 percent, which is 2.5 times higher than the growth rate of fixed capital formation. One particular piece of data demonstrates the extent of the game: every day, in volume, 40 times more financial than market transactions take place (Helleiner, 1996) . Resulting profits are made in extremely short periods; it is estimated that more than half of total return on US equities during the 1980s was made in just 20 days.
One indicator that the world economy is accelerating under the pressure of finance is the increasing rapidity of reconfiguration of financial stocks driven by the strict performance obligations imposed on companies by institutional investors. This quest leads to the ever-increasing instability of capital, which flies from investment to investment in increasingly brief lapses of time. Between 1980 and 1987 the yearly rate of abandoned stocks (obtained through mergers and acquisitions) passed from 20 percent to 75 percent. The turnover rate of stocks on the New York Stock Exchange moved from 30 percent to 70 percent between 1979 and 1989 (Delmas, 1991: 97) .
Thanks to the rise in new information technologies, the interconnection of different stock markets has been made at a speed that is too rapid and constraining for states. States are faced with an incredible acceleration in capital movement. New computer technology allows for arbitrations and corrections to be made in a matter of seconds. In one move, financial investors can rearrange their stock portfolios, hard currency, bonds, stocks, or derivatives and carry out instantaneous arbitrations between different financial instruments and parts of the market or between markets in different emerging countries whose currency or company stocks they retain.
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International Political Science Review 20(3) The globalization of finance has been accompanied by the preeminence of time over space.
16 Space, as a major strategic dimension within a closed world, has lost its preeminence at the end of this century, being bypassed by real time made up of acceleration, urgency, and speed. One objective of deregulation was to shorten transaction times by reducing to a minimum the administrative formalities that inhibited market access. For many companies, losing a few weeks or months before penetrating a market can mean considerable losses on the balance sheet, especially because the life cycle of products is also reduced. In the computer industry, for example, losing six months on a product with a life cycle of approximately 18 months is a luxury that no company can afford. Acceleration of the economy can therefore be measured by taking into account the shortening of waiting periods imposed by deregulation. In the case of Mexico, administrative formalities concerning trade have been considerably reduced and precise waiting periods have been fixed in order to avoid the interference of unnecessary measures. Thus, commercial formalities limited by response dates have gone from 13 percent of all transactions to 91 percent after the deregulation reforms. Moreover, the percentages concerning trade have gone from 38 percent to 68 percent (Contreras, 1996) .
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From a financial point of view, the innovation is not the increase in direct investments but rather their volatility or reaction time. While volumes today are inferior in real terms to volumes attained at the beginning of the century they have become much more volatile and inclined to move rapidly from one point on the globe to another (Bairoch, 1996) . For example, shortly before the Mexican crisis, the market witnessed a spectacular run on the Mexican peso to the height of $1.7 billion in a single day according to the Wall Street Journal of 6 July 1995. The Mexican crisis of 1994 and the Asian crisis of 1997 led to capital flight movements and provoked important contagion effects (on the Asian crisis see Cordonnier, 1998; Goldstein, 1998; Radelet and Sachs, 1998 ; and the article by Roett and Crandall in this issue).
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In their annual report following the Mexican crisis, the Bank of International Settlements of Basel underlined the short-termism of economic agents, particularly those who operate in the capital markets of emerging countries. "Funds of foreign origin," explains the BIS, "can be easily attracted to financial stocks in the hope of attaining a quick gain, without being related to the underlying returns of real stocks" (BIS, 1995: 157) . The Mexican crisis demonstrated the importance of paying attention to the composition of investments and of clearly discriminating between portfolio investments (particularly volatile and able to be rapidly disengaged and direct investments less volatile but with a higher liquidation cost). The last decade has been marked by a veritable explosion of portfolio placements (composed of stocks and bonds) which, far from having suffered from the Mexican crisis, have been reinforced (Folkerts-Landau, 1997; Calvo, Goldstein and Hochreiter, 1996) . Since devaluation of the peso, portfolio investments increased more than 50 percent, attaining $92 billion in 1996 after two years of consecutive regression immediately following the crisis. The 1996 levels have even bypassed the record levels attained in 1993 (37 percent of total capital exchanges). Simultaneously, more stable direct investment exchanges have contracted, passing from 51 percent of total net capital flows towards developing economies in 1995 to 45 percent in 1996 (World Bank, 1997) .
A new development imposed by the increasing use of telecommunications technology is the disappearance of reaction times and the shortening of temporal horizons (Virilio, 1995) . Access to telecommunications technology not only abolishes both space and scope but also duration by shortening delays for ever-diminishing SANTISO: Analysts of Financial and Emerging Markets Analyzed 313 financial costs. Thus the cost, for example, of a 3-minute telephone call from London to New York has been drastically reduced from $245 in 1930 to $3.30 in 1990. An increase in real interest rates has also shortened the temporal horizon of financial operators. Interest rates, veritable barometers of the future, are authentic measures of future prices. Their increase has been translated, over the last few decades, into a quest for short-term profitability to the detriment of long-term investment. The future has thus depreciated, being surpassed by an unending race for profits, which translates, in economic terms, into a lesser value of the present during this century (Santiso, 1998a,b) .
Wall Street's Temporal Myopia
The short-termism of financial markets can also be understood from a socioeconomic perspective by paying more attention to the actors who operate in the market. It is important to point out that, when speaking about markets, one must dissociate different temporalities and temporal horizons. Economic time, like historical time, contains long continuous periods as well as brief oscillations of momentary ruptures. A multiple and contradictory time thus operates in different areas of the world economy, in the market economy as well as in that of financial capitalism. 19 If the market economy could be called the train that transports the world on its quest for speed (measured in growth rates), the financial sphere could be called its motor, or the accelerator that propels this race for speed. The temporal horizons of these two spheres are notably different, the first primarily anchored in the long term, the second, dominated by short-termist reactive intertemporal games. The tempo of the first is propelled by a commercial dynamic that does not escape either chronological or meteorological time. Market activities are sometimes submitted to climatic variations and economic conjunctures and to seasonal and business cycles. It is widely known that economic activity fluctuates widely throughout the year and that even seasonal patterns can help explain business patterns.
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By contrast, the temporality of financial capitalism (making an exception for commodity markets) plays on climatic movements; its dynamic is volatile, requiring constant risk-taking, which sets a precedent for exchanges made in continuous time, without delays or pauses. When seasons are not affecting emerging financial markets, calendars, clock times, and seasonal moods are. Financial volatility is partly caused by the discovery of new information by investors, such as announcements about government statistics that are released during trading hours at specific days of the month or year. Some economists have confirmed that while volatility is more sensitive at certain periods of the year, it can also vary within the same day, such as the unexpected peaks reached around lunchtime. Lunchtime trading in New York, London, Buenos Aires, Mexico and Tokyo has brought with it a non-stop flow of buy and sell orders and, hence, of private information made available to traders. Studies have confirmed that private information has contributed to increasing the volatility of lunchtime prices (Ito, Lyons, and Melvin, 1997) .
Considering political time is essential to helping predict a portion of financial market fluctuations. It is well known that the economy represents an important dimension of the electoral process. If the economy is doing well, voters tend to reward the incumbent. Moreover, even if the correlation is not always clear, budget deficits tend to deepen during election time. In certain emerging markets political time and economic cycles are closely linked; in Mexico and South Korea, for example, the recent crises occurred during presidential election years, which are 314 International Political Science Review 20(3) periods of high political uncertainty. In the case of Mexico, the link between political time and financial crisis is even more recurrent; since 1970 each presidential election has been followed by an impressive financial volatility. In 1982 and 1994 this volatility led to two of the most important financial crises of this century (Santiso, 1999; Lustig, 1995; Frieden, 1995) . This plurality of time within the world economy is also in itself a mixed temporality. The timing of commercial markets is increasingly open and vulnerable to abrupt shifts in capital financial markets. The growing linkages between these different temporalities constitute a critical conjuncture in the history of capitalism, similar to those identified by Braudel during the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when Amsterdam, London, and then New York became the dominant centers of the world economy. Today, the short-term timing of financial markets has had an increasing impact on market capitalism.
In the same way, temporal horizons vary within the different specializations that exist within the financial profession. The temporal horizons of traders are limited to hourly transactions that take place in real time in a day-to-day market.
21 Strategists, on the other hand, dispose of more distance, making anticipations anchored on a scale of several months or years. 22 The temporal horizon of portfolio managers, who manage pension or mutual funds is, on the contrary, often limited to a fixed period of three months during which the performance of their portfolios is evaluated, noted, and classified. 23 Certain managers even develop long-term policies and management styles with a low portfolio turnover ratio, focusing primarily on companies that are undervalued in relation to their shares or profits thus enabling them to hold shares for longer.
24 Most prefer to follow the general trend, to be part of the momentum that carries the market. 25 In general, managers show less interest in the annual reports of companies, focusing on trimesterial profits. This tendency-labeled the "dictatorship of quarterly reports"-is the very foundation of short-termism. Short-termism further accentuates with the diversification of portfolios, particularly in emerging markets. Anglo-Saxon institutional investors are thus able to quickly unravel a given security as long as the rest of the portfolio stays ideally diversified.
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The temporal horizons of economists must be analyzed based on a distinction between market economists and research economists. Those in the first category, according to a Parisian market economist, "feed the traders, buyers and sellers from day to day. In an economic research service, one has more time to look at a relatively distant past in order to better understand a relatively near future; the accent is not put on the prediction of short-term financial parameters. For the market economist, on the contrary, every political event, every announcement of figures, every passage of a law, is a major event to which he must immediately react, within a matter of seconds, in real time." 27 Finally, portfolio managers anchor themselves in quarterly or six-monthly results and performances, recomposing their portfolios by taking into account the signals emitted by the national or commercial accounts in which they have placed their trust. The temporal horizons of these portfolio managers are equally restrained. Some studies suggest that fund managers are increasingly focused on short-term performance, the younger, better educated, and more inclined to change banks that they are (Chevalier and Ellison, 1996) . The remuneration system of portfolio managers equally serves the function of danger pay, which incites investment positions that are increasingly risky the more rewarding they are (promising a potentially larger bonus). Tversky and Kahneman have demonstrated that risk SANTISO: Analysts of Financial and Emerging Markets Analyzed 315 aversion is variable according to the gains or losses implied by a particular decision: individuals become risk-seekers, and not risk-averse, they show, when a decision implies a loss. 28 The greater a potential loss, the more individuals are inclined to take risks, especially if they are not playing with their own funds, as in the financial world.
29 Remuneration based on bonuses amplifies risk-taking. Employment turnover also reconfigures the relatively turbulent market of financial analysts, where it is common to have several posts during the year (Khorana, 1996) . This tendency is particularly strong among investment fund managers. Thus, according to statistics published in Forbes Magazine in August 1997, the annual turnover rate of portfolio managers in firms like Fidelity, Putnam, or AIM is close to 15 percent, and up to 29 percent in an institution like Kemper, which has paradoxically based its commercial policy on the motto "long-term investing in a short-term world." This dynamic has led to a game of musical chairs, provoking a salary race and overbidding for analysts and, sometimes, entire investment teams. Thus, in 1996, the Latin America investment team of ING Barings, one of the most competitive on the market, packed its bags in order to join a main competitor, Deutsche Morgan Grenfell. In total, nearly 40 specialists left the bank, taking a portion of the portfolio clientele with them. Certain stars in the Latin American emerging markets use these negotiating tactics. Moving from one firm to another often secures employees superior salaries at the level of strategists or economists such as Morgan Stanley's Jay Pelosky, Tim Love of ING Barings or Geoffrey Dennis of Bear Stearns, of up to $1 million a year, as reported by the specialized journal Latin Finance, based in Miami. The rising fame of a number of researchers, who are more "market makers" than others, has created a dual-level payment structure in the financial industry, with most analysts earning $100 000 a year and a few chosen analysts (with much more media visibility) bringing in $500 000 or more.
Magazines such as Latin Finance follow the hirings of securities firms monthly. Month after month, merger after merger, the stars and gurus of the Latin American markets move from one firm to another, revealing the fierce hiring competition that opposes top securities firms in their search for top analysts. "The rise of the star analyst-one with enough clout to be able to take important clients and whole teams of analysts along in a move-has given research firms the besieged air of a sports league during trading season" (Latin Finance, 1996: 10) . In this spirit, Latin Finance sponsors the Latin Research Olympics each year. This ranking, based on a questionnaire sent to 4000 individuals at investment firms that are active in the Latin American region, contributes to structuring the Latin American analyst market. In 1996, for example, the gold Equity Strategist Medal went to Robert Pelosky of Morgan Stanley and the Economist Medal went to the Uruguayan born Arturo Porzecanski of ING Barings (one of the few to have foreseen the Mexican crisis).
The analyst market also experiences impressive turbulence after financial turmoil, as the Mexican, Asian, and Russian crises have shown. Since the Mexican crisis, Wall Street research divisions had a major revamping. A firm such as the First National Bank of Chicago left emerging markets by closing down the emerging market division and laying off more than 70 employees. Other banks close and are then bought, such as Peregrine, which was acquired by Santander immediately following the Asian crisis. Others, like ING Barings or HSBC, restructured their Latin American units, closing only a portion of them. Following these crises, some top Latin American researchers lost their jobs, such as John Purcell, a fifty-year old managing director who ended his career at Salomon Brothers Emerging Markets Research Division after the Mexican shock. Purcell was a pioneer in the 316 
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Latin American emerging market and one of the first to believe in the potential of the Mexican stock market. With a PhD in political science from the University of California, Los Angeles, he moved when forty years old from the university to Wall Street where he proceeded to contribute to the Mexican gold rush. As Andrés Oppenheimer reports in his book, "By the early nineties, Salomon Brothers had placed more than $15 billion in Mexico, making juicy profits for its clients. In the process, Purcell's research department had grown from one person in the officehimself-to a staff of twenty-five." The dance of the Golden Boys did not concern only the New York stock exchange, even if it was particularly prominent at Wall Street. In London, competition between investment banks is also particularly virulent, giving rise to an enormous salary race. Some fund managers, such as the once fallen star of Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, Nicola Horlick, an Oxford law graduate and now head of the London office of Société Générale Asset Management, earn between $1 and $2 million. In total, bonuses awarded by the 250 principal banks of the City between June 1995 and June 1996 reached close to £315 million. It is not uncommon for remunerations to soar to more than 10 million francs per year. According to a survey carried out by the London consulting firm Monks Partners, the annual salary (bonus included) of a director of an investment bank can easily pass 2.5 million francs per year for those in charge of financial markets, corporate finance or derivatives, not to speak of traders, whose salaries can easily reach US$1 million.
It is important to underline that this system of remuneration is not without consequences for financial markets. The bonus system improves the performance of traders, analysts and portfolio managers but it also contributes to the brutality of changes in anticipation and contributes also to the short-termist or follow the trend positions adopted by many operators who are forced to either distance themselves as little as possible from median market performance, or to out-perform the market in order to acquire an even greater bonus. It is interesting to note that during the devaluation of the peso during the Mexican crisis of December 1994, the market correction was amplified during January 1995. The timing of the market's overreaction to the devaluation of the peso on 20 December reveals an important bias introduced into the market by the bonus system; only operators who were able to liquidate their positions in December without altering their average performance for the current year (and therefore their bonus) did so; the others had to resign themselves to postpone selling until January . A bonus also serves as danger pay, as operators are obliged to take maximum risk if they hope to make maximum gains.
Risk-taking varies from one individual to another, with a wide majority being inclined to limit it. Tversky, Kahneman, and Thaler's hypothesis that individuals are fundamentally loss-averse, invites further investigation. Loss aversion is a concept that plays a central role in their descriptive theory of decision-making under uncertainty, or prospect theory Tversky, 1979, 1992) . It refers to the tendency of individuals to be more sensitive to reductions rather than to increases, or to losses rather than to gains, in their levels of well-being (Kahneman and Tversky, 1991) . In fact, the choice of risky asset by individuals, they argue, will depend on the investor's time horizon. "The longer the investors intend to hold the asset, the more attractive the risky asset will appear, so long as the investment is not evaluated frequently. To put it another way, two factors contribute to an investor's unwillingness to bear the risks associated with holding equities, loss aversion and a short evaluation period" (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995: 75) . Benartzi and Thaler refer to this combination as "myopic loss aversion." In their investment model, the frequency of portfolio evaluation structures a large part of the temporal horizon of the investor. If the portfolio is evaluated every year, the temporal horizon of the investor will also be annual.
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In general, the temporal regimes financial markets are singularly dominated by a short-term and immediate memory. The horizons of traders, for example, do not go beyond the square horizon of prompters and stock market floor screens which continually display the highs and the lows, or the promises of gains and losses, in a world devoid of delays and antipodes, where tomorrow abolishes today and the distant confounds itself with the immediate. "Which temporal horizon currently dominates financial markets? The time frame in which most exchanges take place is actually less than a day. Most traders keep a position for a few hours and limit or close them that same night or on the weekend" (Frankel, 1996) .
The timing of financial operators can be equated to a world without memory where events pass by without leaving a trace unless to outline what may happen tomorrow.
31 These operators are the lookouts, anticipators of the future. 32 In a world without memory, an instantaneous history made of an unstoppable chronology dominates. Each event erases that which preceded it; a new crisis makes one forget the old. The world view of financial operators could be best described using the metaphor employed by historian Fernand Braudel of a "firefly world" which glows for a few instants before being relegated to the realm of forgetfulness; he says, "I remember, one night, close to Bahia, I was enveloped by the pale fire of phosphorescent fireflies; their pale light shined, burned out, shined again, without truly piercing the clarity of night. In such a way, events, behind their glimmer, remain obscure" (Braudel, 1969: 22) . The world of international finance operates in a similar way: once consumed, in a fraction of a second or several hours at most, the fireflies that are financial markets burn out and the interest of analysts zaps to other emerging markets where other fireflies shine just as brilliantly.
Financial Markets' Memory of the Future
The temporal paradoxes inherent in how financial markets function should be the subject of an in-depth study. One such paradox would involve bringing an unexpected response to the question of physicist Stephen Hawking, who, in the introduction to an essay, asked why one remembers the past and not the future (Hawking, 1988) .
In many cases, financial markets, through the game of anticipation, remember the future. They have the capacity to transform a hypothetical and far-off future into the present, crushing immediate temporal horizons, treating problems that were supposed to arise in a far-off future at the instant, in real time. Financial markets are unique in their capacity to dismantle the most long-term anticipations, thus immediately dismantling present synchronizations. Nowhere else, underlined Lordon in his work, can anticipations potentially be so immediately and radically put into action (Lordon, 1997) . They run into one another, at a rhythm which is close to tachycardia, emerge and then disappear, replaced by new anticipations. Markets transform themselves into worlds without memory, which suffer from amnesia. "The market is a giant autism," underlines one analyst, "the games of opinion are as much deforming games of mirrors where rumors race at the speed of the humors of a handful of makers of the market who lose confidence, then lose their footing." 33 In this world, the speed of forgetting is extremely high. "Actors are 318 International Political Science Review 20(3) faced with a tidal wave of interconnected relations which, by their reverberations, feed an enormous game of reflections that economists and analysts maintain by setting the tone of the times." As an economist of a large Parisian investment bank stated beautifully, "the memory of the past" is overshadowed by "the memory of the future." The most flagrant example is the issue of 100-year bonds by companies like Coca-Cola or Disney which commit themselves to pay investors the borrowed interest over the course of 100 years. In this case, the company gambles that the bonds will still be there in 100 years and the investor gambles that this promise for the future will be fulfilled.
Projecting into the future through the formation of anticipations is not particular to the financial world. It is, in fact, part of any human undertaking. However, it is not as much opening up to the future, as it is one's capacity to tear oneself away from the past that is in question. In the real world, an inert productive infrastructure requires a longer adjustment period that might be decades. A political project is equally confronted with the weight of institutional structures, constitutional synchronizations, and the strain of social relations. The state, contrary to the market, imposes itself as the master of slowness, not of speed. The financial market, on the contrary, has the power to rapidly transform a far-off hypothetical future into an immediate present. The problems which could potentially arise from consolidation of the European Union, as of 1999, are brought into the present moment in order to be treated here and now. In addition , underlines Lordon (1997) , there is a large capacity for amnesia: a five-year worry that puts the market in a trance can be forgotten in half a day. Anticipation then has a short life expectancy, being inevitably pushed toward forgetfulness by another anticipation. The Mexican crisis has already been forgotten thanks to worries about the crisis in Thailand and acceleration of the Dow Jones which passed the 7000 mark in February 1997 and then the 8000 mark in July the same year before establishing a new record in April 1998 by passing the 9000 mark.
Conclusion: An Invitation
The importance of time in economics and politics is amplified by the approach of the end of the millennium. In the economic and financial sphere, time is more than ever the synonym of money. A study carried out by the New York investment bank JP Morgan estimated the potential increase in the volume of business after the year 2000 to be between $80 000 million and $160 000 million.
34
The temporal analysis of financial markets merits more in-depth research. Economists in general are hesitant to integrate the time factor, even in light of abundant research on the subject. 35 Numerous works, notably on political economy, focus on international arbitrations and the redistributive policies carried out by governments whose temporal horizons are relatively short because they are linked to the election cycle. Economists are particularly concerned with budgetary questions: the choice of financing through taxation, or through borrowing. The weight of these appeals to raise supplementary capital particularly interests economists in the United States.
The new classical macro-economics has made serious efforts, under the influence of economists such as Lucas, Kydland, Prescott, Sargent, and Wallace, to reintroduce a dynamic perspective into economics and to inscribe the economy in a temporal perspective. They focus their attention on the intertemporal expectations of SANTISO: Analysts of Financial and Emerging Markets Analyzed 319 economic agents, the existing asymmetries between the unlimited temporal horizon of the state and that limited by the lifespan of households, as well as on the problem of the credibility of political policy whose optimal short-term solutions often bring about long-term losses in well-being (the problem of temporal incoherence). A combined temporal and socio-economic analysis furnishes equally precious analytical tools, which are still unexplored. There are too few empirical studies concerning reconfiguration of the temporal horizons of entrepreneurs. Managers of large companies, major actors on the international scene and important contributors to national economic development, should take into consideration the fluctuations of the international economy as well as the plans of representatives of institutional investors when developing strategies. What does the growing presence of pension funds and mutual funds within corporate governance structures signify for the governing of a company? What is the effect of eventual polarization on the results and quarterly distribution of dividends? Is the very hypothesis of the short-termism of pension funds and mutual funds empirically founded? (see, unpublished and forthcoming papers, Santiso, 1998c, and Giordano, 1999) .
In all, American institutional investors manage more than $10 000 billion and invest in other national markets where they buy stocks in local companies (such as Calpers which has 20 percent of its resources outside the United States). Acquiring shares in these companies then allows them to impose their own management criteria and short-term profit objectives. A major consequence of this corporate governance system is to shorten the temporal horizons of companies which have become increasingly subject to management control procedures founded on the distribution of quarterly dividends. 36 When the short-term profit objectives of institutional management organisms become the decisive parameter, companies are increasingly submitted to financial criteria. 37 No country today can escape this tendency, as evidenced, for example, by the rise in power of foreign stockholders in French capitalism.
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The short-termism of investors who operate in financial markets deserves, to borrow Albert Hirshman's words, to undergo a certain "autosubversion." From financial wizard George Soros to billionaires and businessmen like Sir George Templeton, numerous actors have multiplied long-term actions by establishing permanent foundations that carry their names and also attack long-term problems. 39 One of the most significant examples is donations made in the (longtermist) field of education. The funds collected from private operators by North American universities attest to this fact. Certain schools, such as Stanford University's Business School, raise up to 45 percent of their $44.2 million annual budget in gifts and donations. The results of a survey of 100 of the largest British companies in 1998 has tempered the notion that short-termism is inherent in all financial markets: 98 percent of British firms' leaders consider that investors are long-term. 40 These examples invite further segmentation of financial markets and differentiate more finely the temporal horizons of actors, depending on professional (even within the same profession) and reputational and institutional effects.
In addition, can we put forward the hypothesis that markets are essentially shorttermist in opposition to states that are more long-termist? This question deserves to be explored; the Mexican example underlines how much short-termism seems to be not only a prerogative of the market. The Mexican state, in issuing the famous tesobonos, or the "malditos bonos" as it was called by Arturo Porzecanski, not only 320 International Political Science Review 20(3) sought to gain time, but also to prolong short-termist strategy in order to elude devaluation and correction of the economic trajectory before the deadline of December 1994. The immediate and brutal market correction, in fact, was a blessing in disguise, as remarked by a New York banker: it stopped short the government's impulse to buy more time, forcing it to face the situation immediately. 41 It could not relegate problems indefinitely to a more or less far-off future. By sanctioning Mexico and Thailand, financial markets ended the economic deviations of political leaders, who are occasionally squeezed by the short-termist vice of the political calendar.
An analysis of the temporality of financial markets should be extended to other fields of research. The euro, for example, with its calendar and deadlines, is a significant field of inquiry. Investment banks, in New York, Paris, London, and Frankfurt, have all put their safety nets into place, such as the JP Morgan calculator published regularly by the Financial Times that reports on financial speculations concerning the probability of certain countries joining the monetary union by 1999. At monthly intervals, the Wall Street Journal, in collaboration with the London consulting firm Independent Strategy, publishes a table summarizing anticipations concerning the entrance of certain European countries into the monetary union. Convergence criteria and final deadlines have become familiar parts of the European landscape and vocabulary. How are they apprehended by financial operators? What are the cognitive regimes through which traders and analysts understand construction of the European Union? How do financial operators adjust their expectations to different announcement effects or rescheduling of the euro launch? What beliefs and presuppositions underlie these expectations and the ones following a euro-zone creation?
Concerning emerging markets, this analysis is only a sketch, leaving a number of faces in shadow. A more systematic analysis of the world of analysts with their frames of reference and temporal preferences, as well as a study of the rotation of traders and an analysis of the temporal horizons of portfolio managers permits us to ground the hypothesis of short-termism sociologically. Following the sequence of a financial crisis from day to day should enable us to confront or refute the analysis done in this article.
This investigation was based on post-facto interviews carried out after the crisis and not on impressions captured "live." In many respects, change is not a parade that we can watch pass, as underlined by anthropologist Clifford Geertz in his Memoirs (Geertz, 1995) . Like the American cavalry, we always arrive too late, irreparably after the fact. To grasp the sequence of a financial crisis and the expectations of operators, analysts, and traders before, during, and after it, however, is not beyond reach.
The life of financial markets, I hope to have shown, can only be understood by focusing on the actors. Financial markets are neither the Wild West of the Golden Boys devoid of faith and law, nor a place where the perfect self regulation of an invisible hand reigns. Implicit and explicit norms regulate markets where games of reputation and trust are as influential as turnover. Behind the supposed tutelary power of markets hides a myriad of actors-fund managers, economists, strategists, and analysts-who are a veritable epistemic community with its own codes, rules, prohibitions, and dynamics of opportunity and constraint. Like Geertz examining the myths and rites of communities in Morocco or Indonesia, an indepth study of the life of financial markets should incorporate a little bit more of anthropology. International Political Science Review 20(3) Notes 1. As emphasized by Goetzmann and Jorion (1997) , the Argentinian, Brazilian, and Mexican stock exchanges were created in 1872, 1877, and 1894 respectively, well before most of the Scandinavian stock exchanges. In reality, these markets tend to appear and disappear, the 1990s simply witnessing their latest and most spectacular reemergence. There is a notable difference today, however, when compared with the preceding decade, as financial volumes and the number of actors who currently intervene on financial markets are more important and diversified. 2. For a detailed analysis of the very notion of emerging markets consult the work of Antoine van Agtamel and Keith Park (1993) . The International Finance Corporation (IFC) publishes the official statistics on these markets (which increased from 9 to 25 between 1980 and 1995 Eichengreen and A. Mody (1998) . In addition, the definition of capital flows as "destabilizing" must also be nuanced, if not minimized altogether, as suggest Dooley (1997) and Turner (1995) , in light of the important asymmetries of information which exist in emerging markets, as well as the uncertainty generated by structural changes such as a rapid financial liberalization (in such a case, with a reduction in uncertainty, volatility tends to be reduced over time as investors obtain better, more trustworthy, and less asymmetric information). For more information, consult the works of Mishkin (1998a) , de Bacchetta and van Wincoop (1998) . The works of Obstfeld and Taylor (1998) , on long temporal series reinforce these findings and allow us to place these capital flows, which were already significant at the beginning of the century toward emerging countries like Argentina, in historical perspective. Other works equally demonstrate that states can deal with market volatility by putting systems of capital control into place. See Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1997) , who discuss the effectiveness of the capital control mechanisms put into place by the Chilean government. 4. For further information on the diffusion dynamics of financial crises, refer to the works of Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) . 5. See the works of Fligstein ( , 1998 and Germain (1996 Germain ( , 1997 Borst (1983) and David Landes (1987) . 7. For a general study on the financial community of Wall Street, see the socio-economic analyses of Mitchel Abolafia (1996) . Obalafia's approach is a socio-economic analysis in the tradition of Weber, who wrote essays on the stock market as well as on the ethic of capitalism. The Bibliothèque du Citoyen translated both in 1894-1896 in France. See also anthropological works, in particular those of Ellen Herz (1998) on the Shanghai stock exchange. 8. Concerning this evolution see Chang and Velasco (1998) ; Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) ; Krugman (1996); Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996a,b); and Dornbusch, Goldfajn, and Valdés (1995) . 9. For a synthesis of approaches insisting on financial behavior and on the limits of market efficiency see Robert Shiller (1998) . His web site can be found at http://www.econ.yale.edu.
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10. Another explanation of these cognitive biases can be found in the "inside view effect" underlined by the work of cognitive psychologists such as Kahneman and Lavallo (1993) , who demonstrate the extent to which scenarios and recommendations contain an element of inertia, founding themselves on past success more than on present results and on the fact that analysts ignore other information which might undermine their evaluation. 11. Interview, New York, 15 Feb. 1997. 12 Obstfeld (1998) . 16. Space has not disappeared, however: the localization of stock exchanges, determined according to time lags and the 24 hour service that they allow, are still pertinent. The end of geography actually designates the end of its monopoly or the quest for space as a vector of power. The main issue is no longer to expand a state's territory or to push frontiers further, it is rather to acquire, in record time, significant market shares and to increase the speed of the economy. For a discussion of the relation between space and time in international finance see Nigel Thrift (1994) and Benjamin Cohen (1998). 17. The goal of deregulation mechanisms is, first of all, to reduce transaction costs, which should be zero according to orthodox theory. The zero transaction cost theory supports an hypothesis which has been demonstrated by facts, as Ronald Coase has pointed out concerning exchanges effected without delays. "Another consequence of the assumption of zero transaction costs, not usually noticed, is that when there are no costs of making transactions, it costs nothing to speed them up so that eternity can be experienced in a split second" (Coase, 1998: 15) . 18. Economist Nouriel Roubini has gathered all the essential literature concerning the financial crises, the Asian crisis in particular, on his web site at http://www.stern.nye.edu 19. For more information refer to the Braudelian analysis of Randall Germain (1996 Germain ( , 1997 ; and the Polanyi-inspired chart of the economy's different temporal horizons by Robert Boyer (1996) . Concerning economic temporalities also consult Javier Santiso (1998c) . 20. Economists are aware of seasonal patterns and also of the fact that over the course of the year economic activity is highly volatile. Retail sales shoot up impressively in December, construction projects take off in the spring, and employment follows the rhythm of the school year. In a recent book an economist from Boston University went further by systematically analyzing these seasonal patterns: see Jeffrey Miron (1996) . 21. Interviews, New York, 11 and 12 Feb. 1997 , and Paris 5 Feb. and 6 and 12 Mar. 1997 . 22. Interviews, New York, 13 and 14 Feb. 1997 . 23. Interviews, New York, 12 Feb. 1997 and Paris, 20 June 1997 . 24. Interview, Paris, 21 Aug. 1997 . 25. Interview, New York, 15 Feb. 1997 . Such investors are able to rapidly release stocks or securities. Thus Fidelity, the first mutual fund in the United States, got rid of a packet of 600 million stocks estimated at $1 billion in one shot on Monday 19 October 1987, thus giving a push to the stock market crash. At the end of Black Monday, the Dow Jones index had lost 508 points, or more than 22% of its value. The Mexican crisis of December 1994 was marked by the same 324
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type of mimetic behavior-the panicking of a first group of investors which is then immediately imitated by others-giving way to a tidal wave of massive withdrawals. 27. Interview, Paris, 12 Mar. 1997. 28 . For more information on this topic, see Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979) .
The notion of risk is the object of multiple studies, one of the most stimulating and accessible is that of Peter Bernstein (1996) . 29. The work on financial behavior by Thaler (1993) , currently a professor at the University of Chicago, shows that individuals change their behavior depending on whether or not they are personally owners. According to his famous "endowment effect," individuals have the tendency to sell what they own at a higher price and to buy what they desire at a lower price. 30. We then face several agency problems while pension funds, for example, are indeed likely to exist as long as a company remains in business, the pension fund manager does not expect to maintain his position for long periods of time. This short-term temporal horizon creates a conflict of interest between stockholders and pension fund managers. The importance of the presence of this short temporal horizon in finance is stressed by Shleifer and Vishny (1990) . 31. Every investment bank or financial institution develops forecasting models for speculative crises and early warning systems. Academics have equally tried to furnish predictive models. In an IMF work, Berg and Patillo (1998) have evaluated the productive capacity of three models created before the Asian crisis: their results show that none would have signaled the crisis in a sufficient manner. As Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) have pointed out, in the best case scenario, the strongest indicator out of a total of 16 macro-economic indicators tested during 76 different crises (based on a real exchange rate) only 25% gave good anticipatory signals one out of four times. 32. The behavior of economic agents is oriented toward the future, which they scrutinize through the looking glass of rational, maximizing anticipations. On the temporal horizons of economic agents also consult Becker and Mulligan (1997 Sep. 1997. International Political Science Review 20(3) 
